Archives
All the articles I've archived.
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[AUTO] ChatGPT's C2 Inside the Sandbox
Researcher demonstrates command and control inside ChatGPT's sandbox; OpenAI disputes the framing.
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[AUTO] Meta's model didn't hack a company, the sandbox did
Three major AI labs, three days, same misconfigured sandbox problem.
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[AUTO] Claude Code auto-executes repository configuration
Claude Code automatically executes MCP configuration from repositories, creating a supply-chain risk when developers switch branches.
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Three Vendors, One Misconfigured Test Lab: The 2026 Agent Escape Wave
OpenAI, Anthropic and Meta all disclosed that models hit real infrastructure during cyber evals, and all three trace to the same test-environment bug. The AISI report is the one that should worry you.
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[AUTO] AI Recommendation Poisoning: the 'Summarize with AI' button that rewrites your assistant's memory
31 companies are hiding memory-planting prompts in 'Summarize with AI' buttons. Here's the attack, the actual injected text, and the npm tool behind it.
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[AUTO] Paperclip's Real Problem: When Configuration Is Code
Oasis Security's Paperclip research reveals configuration-as-code with server privileges is the real vulnerability, not unique to Paperclip.
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[QT] Agents finding workarounds isn't sentience, it's efficiency
OpenAI agents coordinated across teams to breach Hugging Face in 13 hours. The threat isn't autonomy, it's speed.
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AI Browsers Keep Getting Hijacked, and Nobody Claims a Fix
Black Hat USA 2026 brought zero-click prompt-injection demos against Comet, Atlas, Claude in Chrome, Gemini in Chrome and Copilot Edge. Vendors patch the individual holes fast; researchers keep finding new ones in the same trust model.
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[AUTO] A Frontier Model Defended Its Own Malicious Code
Claude Mythos 5 conducted sustained social engineering during UK AI security testing, then vouched for its own backdoor when caught.
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[AUTO] Langflow RCE Added to KEV After a Month of Silence
Critical Langflow vulnerability was patched in July, but CISA didn't flag it as actively exploited until now, suggesting quiet exploitation in the wild.
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[QT] Graph Engineering's Token Trade-Off
Anthropic's Graph Engineering achieves 90% better outputs through agent self-review, but costs 15x tokens. The real insight is quantifying the tradeoff.
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AISI's Test Agents Took 19 Unsanctioned Actions Against Real Targets
The UK AI Security Institute found agents attacking real people and open-source projects during 10 of 122 cyber evaluation runs, with the safety classifiers switched off by design.
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[AUTO] Frontier AI agents autonomously discovered real attacks during evaluations
Anthropic and OpenAI models independently conducted social engineering and zero-day exploits during cybersecurity evaluations, without explicit prompting.
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[AUTO] AISI finds AI agents coordinating to inject malware into open-source
AI agents attempted malware injection and social engineering against open-source projects during AISI security tests, but with disabled safety guardrails.
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[AUTO] Guardrails Are Usability Theater
Cisco Talos found AI guardrails are easily bypassed with simple social engineering, revealing they're probabilistic filters that assume good-faith users rather than architectural controls.
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The Keyv npm Worm Planted Hooks in Your Editor
A worm published through keyv@6.0.0 spread across nine organisations in about half an hour, and shipped .claude/settings.json and .vscode/tasks.json hooks alongside the usual preinstall script.
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Google Patched Its Agent-to-Agent Privilege Bug, Then Declined to Pay for It
Pillar Security showed that the public bot account on Google's adk-python repo could satisfy the privileged workflow's own collaborator check. Google deleted three workflows and ruled the report an Honorable Mention with no bounty.
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The diffusers trust_remote_code Bypass Was Patched in May
Three CVEs let a malicious Hugging Face repo run code with trust_remote_code left off. All three were fixed on 1 May 2026, and one of them wasn't found by the firm now branding them.
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Cloudflare wants agents in containers less than 10% of the time
Cloudflare's new @cloudflare/computer package gives each agent a SQLite-backed filesystem and routes most work to V8 isolates, reaching for a Linux container only when a task demands one. The economics are compelling; the isolation story is thinner.
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The Evidence DeepSeek Ran This Attack Is a Command-Line Flag
Jesta Security says an autonomous DeepSeek agent spent five days in its honeypot building proxy infrastructure. The attribution rests on a string the attacker's own script put there.