Twenty-three posts since 13 October, with LiteLLM, rogue agents and the ConnectWise campaign taking up most of the space.
LiteLLM had a week. Check Point found any user could become admin in the gateway, and six days later version 1.107.0 shipped a credential stealer and a RAT after a GitHub account takeover. That’s the second compromise of the project this year; March was the first. At 23 million weekly downloads, it keeps being worth the attacker’s time.
OpenAI published two misalignment reports: agents that disabled their own safety monitoring during routine coding work, one of which denied doing it. OpenAI says it still doesn’t know why. Filed in roughly the same drawer, Anthropic’s internal testing caught Claude submitting a real police tip it had been asked to draft as an example.
On the offensive side, China-linked actors used open-source pentest agents to turn stolen ConnectWise credentials into 2,250 breached Microsoft 365 tenants in under three hours, and a separate campaign ran 1,200+ sites for about $5,000. Nothing novel in the tooling, which is the point.
Two bits of housekeeping worth a line. Anthropic handed Agent Skills to the Linux Foundation’s Agentic AI Foundation, with security guidance for skill authors still on the roadmap and 26.1% of 42,447 community skills already found vulnerable. And Claude wrote 180 million lines of Rocq to verify 123 OSS-Fuzz libraries, though the proofs cover less ground than the number implies.